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actions, 1 20 actions for separate maintenance' 3 ° and actions to set
aside separation agreements. 131
In the instant case the court states that no change in the
former procedure regarding examinations before trial in matrimonial actions has been effected by the CPLR. Although the court
concedes that the Revisers originally intended to abolish the limitations on disclosure, 1 32 the opinion points out that substantial
changes were later (and prior to enactment of) made in section
3101(a) and that, as finally enacted, that section was intended
to continue the scope of disclosure that existed under prior
practice.' 33
Disclosure With Respect to Third-Party Actions
In Ciaffone v. Manhattantown, Inc., 3 4 the third-party defendant moved for a pretrial examination of a defendant other than
the third-party plaintiff. The requested pretrial examination sought
to encompass all the issues of the main action. The court denied
the motion but held that the third-party defendant may examine the
codefendant in the main action only as to those matters which
were material and necessary to the third-party action.
In most of the instances involving pretrial examinations in
third-party actions, it is the original plaintiff who seeks to conduct
an examination of the third-party defendant and vice versa. Early
CPA cases held that unless the original plaintiff amended his
claim so as to assert a claim against the third-party defendant or
the third-party defendant denied the allegations of the main complaint so as to become an adverse party as to the plaintiff, the
demand by either the original plaintiff or the third-party defendant

129 E.g., Grinnell v. Grinnell, 15 App. Div. 2d 468, 222 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st
Dep't 1961); Mook v. Mook, 13 App. Div. 2d 465, 212 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st
Dep't 1961); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 12 App. Div. 2d 627, 208 N.Y.S.2d 343
(2d Dep't 1960); Sefranka v. Sefranka, 190 Misc. 541, 74 N.Y.S.2d 519
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
130E.g., Berlin.v. Berlin, 17 Misc. 2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
131 E.g., Vose v. Vose, 250 App. Div. 883, 295 N.Y. Supp. 244 (2d Dep't
1937): Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 230 App. Div. 483, 245 N.Y. Supp. 253
(1st Dep't 1930); Cavallo v. Cavallo, 33 Misc. 2d 245, 224 N.Y.S.2d 937
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Sallah v. Sallah, 28 Misc. 2d 130, 219 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
132 FIRST REP. 117.
133 1962 N.Y. Lim. Doc. No. 8, SIXTH REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY THE
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE CIVIL PRAcICE AcT

30, 43 [hereinafter cited as SIXTH REP.].

34 20 App. Div. 2d 641, 246 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum
decision).
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to conduct a pretrial examination of the other would be denied. 135
More modem decisions, interpreting Section 193-a(2) of the CPA,
have held that since a third-party defendant is a party to the action
for all purposes and, usually, is the real defendant in the action
because he may ultimately be required to satisfy the original plaintiff's claim, the third-party defendant would be permitted to
examine the original plaintiff regardless130 of whether the formal
pleadings created an issue betveen them.
The present statute, Section 1008 of the CPLR, grants a thirdparty defendant all the rights of a party adverse to the other
parties to the action. By designating him an adverse party, section 1008 has adopted the modern approach and, hence, the
third-party defendant is immediately afforded the same rights as
the original defendant. One of the rights of the original defendant
is the right to conduct a pretrial examination of one of his code13 7
fendants although neither asserted a claim against the other.
Therefore, since the original defendant could have conducted a
pretrial examination of his codefendant as to all issues involved
in the main action and since the third-party defendant under CPLR
Section 1008 and under later CPA decisions is immediately afforded
the rights of the original defendant, it would seem that the court,
by not permitting the third-party defendant to occupy fully the
position of the third-party plaintiff (a codefendant in the main
action), has not decided the question within the spirit of section
1008.
Party Taking His Own Testimony
In Lapensky v. Gordon,138 the defendant moved to vacate
plaintiff's notice to take a deposition of plaintiff's own testimony.
The court denied the motion by liberally construing the pertinent
provisions of the CPLR.
Section 288 of the CPA provided that "any party to an action
. . . may cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own
135 E.g., Salgo v. Amdor Structures, 133 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Gfle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct), 2d case, aff'd,
281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dep't 1952); Reizer v. Pardes,
197 Misc. 384, 98 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Anida Realty Corp. v.
6145 Realty Corp., 197 Misc. 157, 94 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Foote
v. Joseph Bisceglia & Sons, 195 Misc. 19, 80 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
13 6 Argento v. Beech & Bowne Building Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 513, 236
N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Sorrentino v. City of N.Y., 14 Misc. 2d 78,
1783 7N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct 1958).
1 Hensel v. Held, 17 App. Div. 2d 806, 233 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st Dep't 1962)
(memorandum decision); Frost v. Walsh, 195 Misc. 391, 90 N.Y.S.2d 174,
aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum
decision).
13841 Misc. 2d 958, 246 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1964).

